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An enormous body of literature exists on intergovernmentaltransfers between central governments and federal subunits.
This work focuses almost exclusively on the economic justifications
for such transfers, their design, and the challenges they pose to
democratic accountability, transparency, and the autonomy of fed-
eral subunits. The legal dimension of intergovernmental transfers
has received comparatively little scholarly attention. This oversight
may be deliberate, as it has been argued that “in the end intergov-
ernmental transfers are the instruments, not the determinants of
public policy” (Bird and Tarasov 2002, p. 23, emphasis in original).
Legal frameworks cannot be entirely neutral. Systems of
intergovernmental transfers are constituted and governed by
domestic constitutional law, intergovernmental agreements, and
legislation. One cannot fully appreciate how these systems oper-
ate without studying the legal instruments through which inter-
governmental transfers are provided as well as their interpretation
and enforcement by the courts. Each legal framework involves
crucial design choices that determine which level of government
makes the rules governing intergovernmental transfers, who may
modify those rules and under what conditions, and who resolves inter-
governmental conflicts when they arise. Every design choice reflects policy
preferences in favor of centralization versus decentralization, political deci-
sion making versus adjudication, fiscal autonomy versus fiscal restraint,
and acceptance of economic disparity versus insistence on fiscal solidarity.
Policy preferences are thus embedded in the legal structure of every inter-
governmental transfer system.
This chapter examines the legal architecture of intergovernmental trans-
fers through a series of case studies. The first section draws on the Canadian
experience. It briefly reviews the political economy of intergovernmental
transfers in federations. While both equity and efficiency concerns argue in
favor of intergovernmental transfers, the Canadian experience illustrates how
these transfers may pose challenges to democratic accountability, trans-
parency, and the autonomy of federal subunits. A series of general design fea-
tures are examined in order to assess and compare the legal arrangements of
this aspect of fiscal federalism. The second section uses these design features
to explore case studies of Belgium, Germany, India, and South Africa. The last
section draws some tentative conclusions from the case studies about the
impact of legal design on the legitimacy, effectiveness, and stability of systems
of intergovernmental transfers.
Law and the Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism
The political economy of fiscal federalism illustrates the importance of the
legal design of intergovernmental transfers. The principal economic argu-
ment for decentralized decision making (including federalism) is that it
produces a better fit between citizens’ preferences and public policies than
would be the case in a unitary state, for two reasons (Tiebout 1956). First,
the existence of federal arrangements allows a territorially concentrated
minority to become a local majority, allowing it to vote for policies that
would not win majorities at the national level. Second, through migration
citizens presumably sort themselves into provincial populations that are
much more homogeneous than the national population as a whole.
By contrast, unitary states are less sensitive to different preferences for
publicly provided goods and services, which are averaged out by the
national majority. Though these preferences may vary over time, unitary
states are more likely to provide a single package, which citizens cannot opt
out of (except through emigration). But as Boadway (2001) argues, inter-
governmental fiscal transfers are necessary to ensure that the benefits of
decentralization do not come at the expense of overarching objectives such
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as efficiency and equity.1 Intergovernmental transfers help offset inefficient
fiscally induced migration driven by differences in fiscal capacity across
federal subunits. From the vantage point of equity, intergovernmental
transfers guard against redistributive races to the bottom and promote hor-
izontal equity by providing federal subunits of varying fiscal capacities with
the ability to provide comparable levels of public services at comparable
levels of taxation. Indeed, in Canada the importance of promoting hori-
zontal equity is signaled by its inclusion in the constitution as a principle to
which the federal government is committed, through the mechanism of
equalization payments.
These standard arguments in favor of intergovernmental transfers have
been widely discussed in academic and policy circles for more than 50 years.
It is therefore of interest that they have generated a host of normative crit-
icisms, which have been framed as a combination of arguments from fed-
eralism and democratic accountability (Petter 1989). To a considerable
extent, these criticisms have been driven by the use of conditional grants by
the federal government to ensure provincial compliance with national stan-
dards for health care and (earlier) social assistance (although there is some
dispute as to whether these national standards are sufficiently detailed to
qualify as conditions).
In Canada these debates over intergovernmental transfers have often
involved legal arguments. Some political actors have challenged the consti-
tutionality of transfers and conditional payments. Others have advanced a
vast array of policy proposals regarding the legal architecture of transfer
payments—that the rules governing transfer payments be constitutionally
entrenched, that they require provincial consent to establish new federal
transfer programs, that provinces be given the right to opt out of conditional
programs with full compensation, that federal-provincial agreements be
constitutionally entrenched, that the courts enforce such arrangements, and
so on. The lesson from the Canadian experience is that law has infused the
fiscal federalism discourse and has been a principal mechanism for address-
ing concerns about the design of intergovernmental transfer payments.
The Canadian experience suggests that the following general design
features can be used to assess and compare the legal aspects of fiscal transfers
in a federation:
1. Legal basis of intergovernmental transfer system. Does the central govern-
ment have a legal duty to make intergovernmental transfers to subunits?
To what extent is the system based on a combination of constitutional
law, federal statutes (super-majority and simple majority), regulations,
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ministerial decisions, and intergovernmental agreements? Does the
central government have the legal power to directly make transfers to
provinces to subsidize public expenditures in areas of provincial juris-
diction (that is, is there federal spending power)?
2. Procedures for establishing and modifying intergovernmental transfers.
Does the central government have the power to unilaterally establish,
modify, and terminate the terms of intergovernmental transfers (for
example, level, conditions), or is subunit involvement legally required? If
subunit involvement is legally required, what is the nature of participa-
tion—notice, consultation, or consent? May individual subunits and the
central government enter into intergovernmental agreements for transfers?
3. Conditional and unconditional transfers. May the central government
attach conditions to fiscal transfers, or must grants be unconditional?
If grants may be conditional, are there any legal limits on the specificity
of these conditions? If grants may be conditional, what are the legal
consequences, if any, for subunits that violate these conditions? Do sub-
units have the right to opt out of conditional intergovernmental trans-
fers? If so, do they have the right to compensation if certain conditions
are met?
4. Dispute resolution and adjudication. How are disputes concerning
intergovernmental fiscal transfers addressed? May intergovernmental
transfers be judicially enforced, or are they nonjusticiable? To what
extent does dispute resolution rely on constitutional principles (that is,
federal loyalty), ad hoc political negotiations, mediation/conciliation,
administrative proceedings, or constitutional adjudication? How have
these mechanisms worked in practice?
Together these design features constitute the legal framework of fiscal
federalism. Given that intergovernmental fiscal transfers play an important
role in realizing the theoretical benefits of a federal system of government,
they warrant particular attention.
Case Studies
These design features are used to explore case studies of Belgium, Germany,
India, and South Africa. The cases include countries in which the scope of
legislative authority matches the scope of executive authority (India) and
those in which subunits administer federally enacted and designed policies
(Germany). It includes developed countries (Belgium, Germany) and devel-
oping ones (India, South Africa); new (Germany, India) and very new
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(Belgium, South Africa) federations; and federations from both the com-
mon law (India, South Africa) and civil law (Belgium, Germany) traditions.
Systems of Government in the Case Study Countries
Before describing and analyzing the legal architecture of intergovern-
mental transfers in the countries selected, it is necessary to identify the
different levels of government involved and the powers attributed to
them.
Belgium
Belgium embarked on its federal project in 1970. In 1993 its Constitution
was substantially overhauled to create an innovative federal system of
government, with two overlapping types of subunits: regions, which are
geographically defined (Flemish, Walloon, and Brussels), and communities,
which are based on language (Flemish, French, and German).2
Articles 127–130 of the Belgian Constitution grant jurisdiction to
communities in the fields of cultural affairs, education, health, language
policy, intercommunity cooperation, and international cooperation.
Many of these areas, such as health, are the subject of shared jurisdiction
with the federal government. The regions, however, are not explicitly
granted legislative authority over certain areas of responsibility. Instead,
these are defined in special legislation that requires a two-thirds majority
vote by both the federal Chamber of Representatives and the Senate. The
regions have assumed jurisdiction in areas such as economic policy,
employment, transportation, public works, trade, agriculture, and energy.
Since 1993 the federal government has formally enjoyed residual juris-
diction until its powers are more clearly delimited. The intergovernmental
agreements discussed in detail below suggest that “the federal government
is more decentralized at present and its fields of jurisdiction are diminishing
for the benefit of the regions, not the communities” (Van der Stichele and
Verdonck 2002, p. 40).
Germany
Federalism was not a new phenomenon in Germany after World War II, but
it was solidified in the Basic Law of 1949.3 It remained the structure of gov-
ernment after reunification with East Germany in 1990. The two main levels
of government are the federal government (the Bund) and the (16) states
(Länder).
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The federal division of powers in Germany is set out in the Basic Law.
The Länder exercise residual powers and are responsible for implementing
and administering many federal laws. They also share jurisdiction with the
Bund in several areas. In practice, the Bund “has widely eroded the legislative
power of the states [Länder] and enacts the overwhelming majority of
legislation today” (Larsen 1999, pp. 433–44). Germany does not have water-
tight compartments in its division of powers (Heun 1995).
An important institution in German fiscal federalism is the Council of
State Governments (the Bundesrat), the upper house of the federal govern-
ment. Specifically designed to represent the interests of the Länder, the
Bundesrat is made up of members appointed (and recalled) by the Land
governments. Each Land has a minimum of three and a maximum of six
votes (depending on the size of its population), which must be voted as a
block in the Bundesrat; the members of the Bundesrat do not act in their
personal capacities but are agents of their Land government. While the
Bundesrat is not as powerful as the Bundestag, the elected lower house, it
does have “a suspensive veto over legislation generally and an absolute veto
over all legislation affecting the vital interests of the Länder” (Kommers
1997, p. 97). It is well accepted that any law affecting the revenue of the
Länder falls within the scope of an absolute veto and therefore requires the
consent of the Bundesrat.
India
India has a system of government that is “basically federal, but with striking
unitary features” (Vithal and Sastry 2001, p. 14). It comprises the union, 28
states, 7 union territories, and local governments. India’s constitution
defines the exclusive and concurrent powers of the states and the union. The
union retains residual powers and may make any law imposing a tax not
mentioned in the lists annexed to the Constitution. The exclusive powers of
the union include defense, foreign affairs, banking, insurance, railways,
currency, stock exchanges, and enumerated taxes. The exclusive powers of
the states include health, unemployment, agriculture, and enumerated taxes.
Concurrent areas of power include criminal law and procedure, forests,
economic and social planning, competition law, and electricity, to name a
few. The states determine the revenue that will be devolved to local govern-
ments through state finance commissions.
South Africa
The Constitution of South Africa, 1996 does not explicitly identify its system of
government as federal.4 Instead, it describes a government “constituted as
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national, provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive,
interdependent and interrelated” (Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa). Schedule 4 of the Constitution sets out concurrent areas of responsi-
bility of the national and provincial governments; Schedule 5 enumerates
exclusive areas of provincial responsibility. The nine provinces are responsible
for health, education, welfare, and roads. Nevertheless, the Constitutional
Court of South Africa has ruled that the provinces enjoy limited autonomy and
that they “are the recipients of power and not the source of power” (Constitu-
tional Court of South Africa 1996, para. 14). Local governments, which have
undergone consolidation, are responsible for urban infrastructure, including
water, sanitation, traffic, and garbage collection. Municipal governments have
the right to administer matters listed in Part B of Schedules 4 and 5.
Legal Basis of Intergovernmental Transfer System
The legal architecture of an intergovernmental transfer system may consist
of constitutional law, federal statutes, regulations, ministerial decisions, and
intergovernmental agreements. Every country relies on these legal instru-
ments to varying degrees and in different ways. A given legal instrument may
be mandatory (imposing a duty to transfer an “equitable share” of national
revenue, as in South Africa, for example) or enabling (allowing grants to be
made for “any public purpose,” as in India, for example).
The extent to which each type of legal instrument is relied on has
important implications for the legitimacy, transparency, political accept-
ance, justiciability, certainty, and flexibility of an intergovernmental trans-
fer system. Designing an intergovernmental transfer system that will meet
these short- and long-term objectives is a complex task, as each legal instru-
ment offers its own advantages and disadvantages. A constitutional clause
may help ensure legitimacy and certainty, for example, but it may be inflex-
ible and lack political acceptance in the future. A unilateral ministerial deci-
sion may be flexible and politically expedient, but it may lack transparency
and certainty.
Since no single legal instrument can optimize each of the objectives of
an intergovernmental transfer system, most countries adopt a complex,
interlocking set of legal instruments to suit the current and prospective
needs of society. In addition to being economically and legally complex,
these laws evolve over time, making them difficult to rationalize from a com-
parative perspective. Therefore, in considering the legal architecture of the
intergovernmental transfer systems under review, emphasis is placed on
their enduring and general qualities.
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Belgium
The development of Belgium’s intergovernmental fiscal transfer system is
based on a series of political negotiations that have been codified in “special”
federal legislation. This legislation requires a two-thirds majority in the
federal legislature and a majority among each of the two linguistic groups in
the federal parliament. The legislation is the culmination of negotiations
and renegotiations among political actors. The first set of such laws came
into existence in August 1980, when the regions received fiscal transfers
based on three criteria of equal weight: population, personal income tax rev-
enues, and territorial surface area. The communities were financed based on
an approximate percentage of the population that was French and Flemish
(Gérard 2001, pp. 12–13).
As new fields of jurisdiction were transferred to the regions and com-
munities, special legislation was passed to provide appropriate levels of
intergovernmental transfers. The Regionalization Law (August 8, 1988)
established a federal transfer of 28 percent of income tax revenues to the
regions. The Special Financing Act (1989) provided for a value added (VAT)
and personal income tax transfer to the communities. Communities had
complete financial autonomy in terms of the use of transferred funds, but
they were unable to affect either the amounts or sources of these transfers
(Van der Stichele and Verdonck 2002, p. 5).
This act was originally designed to function during a transitional
phase between 1989 and 1999. However, after only four years, the French
community faced serious difficulties in financing education. As a result,
the Saint-Michel Agreement of 1993 was adopted, by a special law of July
16, 1993 (amending the Special Financing Act). Complementing this
agreement, the Saint-Quentin Agreement of 1993 authorized the transfer
of certain fields of its jurisdiction to the Commission Communautaire
Française (in the Brussels region) and the Walloon region, without mak-
ing sufficient transfers to cover the previous budgets of these areas of
responsibility. This action was implemented through Decree II of the
French-speaking community of July 19, 1993.5 As the transitional phase
came to a close, political negotiations encountered difficulties. It was not
until May 23, 2000, that a new act was adopted, based on the Saint-Éloi
Agreement of 1999, altering the allocation of the value added transfer
between the communities.
A more permanent solution to the chronic community underfunding
was the subject of the Saint-Polycarpe (or Lambermont) Agreement of January
2001, embodied in two pieces of special legislation passed July 13, 2001. The
first regarded the refinancing of the communities and the broadening of the
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tax jurisdiction of the regions. The second concerned the transfer of various
fields of jurisdiction to the regions and communities.
In contrast to the French- and Flemish-speaking communities, the
German-speaking community relies largely on structural grants not con-
nected to any tax base (OECD 2002). In practice, the transfers, which are
unique to this community, are based on the number of German-speaking
students (Van der Stichele and Verdonck 2002, p. 15).
The Belgian Constitution is vague regarding the existence of a federal
spending power, but it has been “progressively gaining ground” (Commis-
sion sur le Déséquilibre Fiscal 2002). Generally speaking,“spending power”
does not find a constitutional basis in Belgium, and federated entities may
“in principle be freely assigned to their expenditures” (Van der Stichele and
Verdonck 2002, p. 29). Braun (2003, p. 55) has gone as far as to state that “one
can contend that in the Belgian system there is no unilateral action on the
part of the federal government in fiscal policy making because the federal
government is composed of regional actors.”
The legal basis for intergovernmental transfers in Belgium relies less on
constitutional law and more on ad hoc political negotiations that are then
codified in special legislation at the national level. As practice has confirmed,
this design feature has privileged flexibility over certainty.
Germany
The federal Constitutional Court of Germany has ruled that the fiscal
provisions of the Basic Law are the cornerstone of German federalism
(Macdonald 1996). These provisions are interlocked with several pieces of
legislation. In 1949 and again in 1990, Germany was faced with vast regional
disparity, which meant that “balanced regional development and uniformity
of living conditions throughout the nation became attractive features for
policy making and institution building” (Spahn 2001, p. 2).6 While intergov-
ernmental fiscal transfers have always been important in German federalism,
they surged after major reforms in 1969 and again with reunification.
Chapter X of Germany’s Basic Law sets out the complex intergovern-
mental transfer system. The Bund provides the Länder with funding when
they implement and administer federal law, based on the principle of fair
compensation, which promotes vertical fiscal balance. The Bundestag, which
is composed of Länder appointees, maintains oversight over most federal
laws dealing with intergovernmental finance in Germany.
Revenues from various taxes are allocated to the Bund, the Länder, or
jointly. In determining the allocation of joint taxes (income taxes, corpora-
tion taxes, and VAT, which account for about 75 percent of tax revenue
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[Larsen 1999]), the Basic Law provides that the Bund and Länder share
revenues from income taxes and corporate taxes equally. Income tax
allocated to the Länder is distributed among them based on the residence of
the taxpayer (not the Land in which the taxpayer works). Corporate taxes are
distributed based on a formula that deals with firms with operations in more
than one Länder. The distribution of the VAT is more complex and involves
indirect equalization.
The horizontal fiscal equalization system in Germany is made up of
three constitutionally mandated elements, all of which require federal legis-
lation to implement: VAT sharing, Länder financial adjustment, and federal
auxiliary assignments. The Basic Law mandates a federal statute, requiring
the approval of the Bundesrat, to determine how the VAT is to be divided
between the Bund and Länder and among the Länder. This is guided by Arti-
cle 106(3)(2) of the Basic Law, which requires that federal legislation com-
ply with the principle that uniformity of living conditions in the federal
territory be ensured.7
At least three-quarters of the VAT revenues transferred from the Bund
to the Länder are distributed among the Länder based on their per capita
share of national VAT revenues (Larsen 1999). The remaining quarter is dis-
tributed to Länder in which the per capita revenue from Land taxes, income
taxes, and corporate taxes is below the national average of all the Länder
combined. The federal Constitutional Court has criticized the distribution
of the VAT in this fashion, since equalization can be achieved in a better and
simpler manner through other mechanisms, discussed below (Larsen 1999).
Since the premise of German fiscal federalism is vertical balance, a
system of direct horizontal transfers is required for any effective equaliza-
tion scheme. The constitutional basis for direct equalization is set out in the
Basic Law, which requires “that a reasonable equalization between finan-
cially strong and financially weak Länder is achieved.” The Bundesrat must
consent to the equalization formula.
This wording is given effect in the equalization law. The formula for the
law is extremely complex. It includes four distinct processes: assessing the
financial capacity of each Land, determining the demographics of each Land,
applying an equalization index, and collecting contributions from Länder with
surpluses and making contributions to Länder with deficits (Wilkins 2001).
This system has given rise to several constitutional showdowns between
the Bund and certain Länder before the federal Constitutional Court. These
cases demonstrate the significance of the constitutionalization of principles
and mechanisms of intergovernmental fiscal transfers when combined with
a strong adjudicative body.
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In the Finance Equalization Case I (1952), the federal Constitutional
Court ruled that horizontal financial adjustments from an economically
stronger Land in favor of a poorer Land was consistent with the Basic Law
but that this would not be the case “if it would weaken the [financial] capacity
of the contributing states or lead to a financial leveling of the states” (cited
in Kommers 1997, p. 91). The Court relied on Article 109 of the Basic Law,
which states that the Länder are “autonomous and independent of each
other with regard to their respective budgets,” but it tempered its judgment
based on the language of solidarity, holding that “the states have duties as
well as rights. . . . [Strong states are] to assist, within limits, the financially
poorer states”(cited in Kommers 1997, p. 91).
In the Finance Equalization Case II (1986), the Court invalidated various
parts of the equalization law for “excessive leveling” and for miscalculating
the economic strength of the Länder (Currie 1994). In particular, it found
that the law violated Article 107(2) of the Basic Law, which requires that
financial equalization be “reasonable.” By way of a remedy, the Court
instructed the legislature to change the basis for allocating tax revenues
among the Länder by 1998 (Kommers 1997).
In 1999 Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, and Hesse challenged the equal-
ization law before the federal Constitutional Court. They argued that hori-
zontal equalization transfers had become excessive and that better incentives
for economic performance were needed. The Court recognized the need for
a “degree of competition among the individual states as secured by the fed-
eral principle [that is also] innovation-fostering” (Spahn 2001, p. 15). It not
only required revision of the existing equalization law, it also mandated that
it be based on a new law on general standards. This law would have quasi-
constitutional status and “define in an abstract and general way the objec-
tives of adjustments as well as the factors underlying an adjustment in
vertical and horizontal equalization on the basis of the regulations laid down
in the constitution” (Beierl 2001, p. 8). It appears that the new law restricts
transfers to neutral assessments and excludes pork barreling.
The 1999 federal Constitutional Court ruling on the equalization law
found that equalization of the Länder at 95 percent of the national average
is sufficient to conform to the Basic Law. The new equalization legislation,
which decreases contributions by some Länder, provides for corresponding
increases in supplementary grants by the Bund.
Supplementary grants from the Bund in favor of certain Länder are a
third aspect of equalization transfers in Germany (vertical asymmetric
transfers). Article 107(2) of the Basic Law permits these intergovernmental
transfers to be made through a federal statute. Based on this nonmandatory
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language, it is not surprising that these supplementary grants were insignif-
icant in the early years of German federalism. Only after reunification have
they come to play an important role in the intergovernmental transfer
regime. Solidarity Pact I and Solidarity Pact II, discussed below in the section
on conditional and unconditional transfers, are the most notable forms of
supplementary grants.
The federal Constitutional Court has upheld the asymmetric nature of
supplementary grants. However, based on the doctrine of federal equal
treatment, similarly situated Länder are entitled to receive the same sup-
plementary grants according to their financial need.
Applying this doctrine in the Finance Equalization Case III (1992), the
federal Constitutional Court rejected the claim of Hamburg that it was
entitled to receive a grant given to Bremen and Saarland, on the grounds that
Hamburg was not as heavily indebted as they were. The Court found that
“Bremen had been the victim of constitutional discrimination because the
city[-state] had received no transfer payments for several years and later
received less financial aid than Saarland, even though Bremen had substan-
tially higher debts than Saarland. Finally, the court ruled that the federal
government’s vertical payments to Bremen and Saarland had been too low
in view of the serious budgetary problems of both states” (Kommers 1997,
p. 91). The remedy was for the Bund and other Länder to provide additional
financial assistance to both Bremen and Saarland.
The federal Constitutional Court has also held that there is a direct rela-
tionship between the level of equalization achieved through the equalization
law and supplementary grants. According to the Court,“the lower the finan-
cial equalization law sets the equalization level for the horizontal equaliza-
tion, the more the providing of general supplemental grants becomes a
virtual duty of the Federation” (Larsen 1999, p. 459).
Germany does not have unrestrained spending power, because the Länder
have a direct voice in authorizing federal spending in their areas of jurisdic-
tion through the Bundesrat. This rule was applied by the federal Constitu-
tional Court in 1976, when it invalidated a federal program that directly gave
funds to local governments for, inter alia, the construction of waste disposal
facilities, on the grounds that it infringed Länder autonomy because the
Länder had not given their formal agreement to the program and the Bundesrat
had not approved it.
The legal basis for intergovernmental transfers in Germany is archetyp-
ically constitutional in nature. The shortcomings of such heavy reliance on
constitutional provisions, such as inflexibility, have been felt, but these
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provisions have simply been the subject of more-frequent amendment than
other constitutional articles.
India
India’s system of intergovernmental transfers is a “complicated mix of
constitutional assignments, institutional precedents, discretion and negotia-
tion” (Rao and Singh 2000, p. 2).8 The Constitution “recognizes that the
assignment of tax powers creates vertical imbalances and provides princi-
ples for the sharing of resources between the center and states” (Purfield
2004, p. 27). An additional underlying consideration of the framers was that
horizontal imbalances would need to be addressed “for an even and
equitable development of all regions of the country” (Vithal and Sastry
2001, p. 24). To accomplish these goals, the Constitution includes manda-
tory and enabling provisions for intergovernmental transfers.
India’s intergovernmental transfer system is best understood when
deconstructed into the three main federal institutions that constitute it: the
Finance Commission (central tax revenue distribution and grants), the
Planning Commission (grants and loans for development), and various
central ministries (shared cost programs). The notion of a neutral and
expert advisory commission to deal with intergovernmental transfers was
based on the early success of the Commonwealth Grants Commission,
created in 1933 for Australia. In 1949 the Constitution of India established
a finance commission to make recommendations to the president, which are
placed before Parliament, on the distribution of net tax revenues to be
divided between the union and the states as well as on the allocation among
the states; to establish principles to govern the grants-in-aid to states from
the consolidated fund; to set up measures to augment the needs of local gov-
ernments, as recommended by state finance commissions; and to handle
other matters of finance referred by the president. These recommendations
are usually accepted by the central government.9
The Constitution of India requires the president to appoint a finance
commission every five years, or earlier as necessary.10 The Finance Commis-
sion (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1951 specifies the qualifications and
manner of selection of members of the Finance Commission as well as their
powers. Section 3 of the act requires the chairman to have “experience in
public affairs”; the other four members of the Finance Commission must
meet more-specific criteria. The presence of a judicial member on the
Finance Commission is “supposed to give it an independent, semi-judicial
status” (Rao and Singh 2000, p. 90). This is buttressed by Section 8(1) of the
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act, under which the Finance Commission is given all the powers of a civil
court. Individual members of a given Finance Commission are able to
append a “Minute of Dissent or Minute expressing an individual member’s
thoughts on the subject under review” (Vithal and Sastry 2001, p. 91).
The 80th Amendment to the Constitution (2000) fundamentally altered
the union tax revenues subject to distribution among the states. Before this
amendment, only specific taxes were subject to intergovernmental transfer.
The new distribution of tax revenues is believed to provide greater certainty
and stability of state revenue and increased flexibility in tax reform. Article
270 of the Constitution provides that all taxes and duties of the union (with
a few minor exceptions) shall be distributed between the union and the
states based on a percentage recommended by the Finance Commission and
prescribed by the president.11 Each Finance Commission will review the
percentage of net union tax revenue (tax proceeds less the cost of collection)
to be distributed to the states and between them. From 1996 to 2000, 29
percent of gross union tax revenue proceeds were transferred to the states.
Under Article 275 of the Constitution, the Finance Commission also
makes recommendations for grants-in-aid to be made from the union to
specific states that are “in need of assistance.” These grants can be adopted
only on the recommendation of the Finance Commission (Vithal and Sastry
2001). These are typically gap-filling transfers based on projected shortfalls
between a state’s revenues (after the above transfers are made) and its
non–development plan expenditures.12
The Planning Commission is a political body, established by an execu-
tive order of the central government in March 1950. It has a smaller but
increasingly important role in recommending a combination of grants and
loans from central ministry programs to states for their development plans.
Transfers made on the recommendation of the Planning Commission are
nonstatutory transfers.
The constitutional basis of Planning Commission transfers is said to be
Article 282 of the Constitution, which provides that “the Union or a state may
make any grants for any public purpose.” Grants under this article are con-
troversial for two reasons. First, they circumvent the oversight of the Finance
Commission. Second, they were originally intended for emergencies such as
natural disasters or famine but have been used much more broadly (Sury
1999).As a result, some Indian constitutional experts question the legitimacy
and constitutionality of these grants (Rao and Singh 2000).
The Planning Commission provides some indirect equalization. With
some modifications, the prevailing approach has been the “Gadgil formula,”
under which the ratio of grants to loans provided to a state depends on
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whether it is classified as being in financial need. The formula was created
by consensus of the National Development Council, an informal intergov-
ernmental body established in 1952 that is chaired by the prime minister and
includes members of the Planning Commission, central government cabinet
ministers, and state chief ministers.
Central government ministries in India make fiscal transfers that states
are required to match (to various degrees, depending on the project) to
implement policies of the center. These programs are recommended by the
Planning Commission. Since the programs usually concern powers vested
in the states, they can be seen as a manifestation of a spending power. Patil
(1995) suggests that in some state areas of responsibility, spending by the
center may even outstrip state spending. States have also complained of
heightened spending by the center in concurrent areas of responsibility.
A mélange of legal instruments serve as the legal basis for intergovern-
mental transfers in India. This has resulted in some uncertainty and con-
cerns over the legitimacy of some transfers, including Planning Commission
grants, which have been without a strong basis in constitutional law or
statute.
South Africa
With the end of apartheid, South Africa faced the “special challenge of
redressing enormous disparities—both political and economic—among
jurisdictions that had long been subject to strict racial segregation and very
different types and levels of public services and revenues”(Smoke 2001, p. 15).
As a result, intergovernmental transfers took on an important role in this
period. One of the founding constitutional principles applied by the Con-
stitutional Court in certifying the 1996 Constitution was whether it made
“adequate provision for fiscal and financial allocations to the provincial and
local levels of government from revenue collected nationally” (Certification
Case, Constitutional Court of South Africa, para. 45(k)).
Chapter 13 of the Constitution deals with intergovernmental fiscal
transfers. Section 227(1)(a) enshrines the principle that provincial and local
governments are “entitled to an equitable share of revenue raised nationally
to enable it to provide basic services and perform the functions allocated to
it.” This fiscal transfer is to take place “promptly and without deduction.”
Section 214(1) mandates that an act of Parliament must provide for the sys-
tem of intergovernmental transfers, including:
 The equitable division of revenue raised nationally by the national,
provincial, and local spheres of government.
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 The determination of each province’s equitable share of the provincial
share of that revenue.
 Any other allocations to provinces, local governments, or municipalities
from the national government’s share of that revenue and any conditions
on which those allocations may be made.
The Constitutional Court has stated that there are both “substantive and
procedural safeguards in determining the actual amount of the equitable
share” (Certification Case, Constitutional Court of South Africa). Procedu-
rally, provincial and organized local governments must be consulted and the
recommendations of the Financial and Fiscal Commission considered
before this “equitable share” law may be adopted. The Constitution requires
that the following factors be taken into account:
 The national interest.
 Any provision that must be made in respect of the national debt or other
national obligations.
 The needs and interests of the national government, determined by
objective criteria.
 The need to ensure that the provinces and municipalities are able to pro-
vide basic services and perform the functions allocated to them.
 The fiscal capacity and efficiency of the provinces and municipalities.
 Developmental and other needs of provinces, local governments, and
municipalities.
 Economic disparities within and among the provinces.
 The obligations of the provinces and municipalities in terms of national
legislation.
 The desirability of stable and predictable allocations of revenue shares.
 The need for flexibility in responding to emergencies or other temporary
needs.
 Other factors based on similar objective criteria.
Since 1998 the framework legislation giving effect to these constitu-
tional provisions has been the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, 1997.
Section 10 of this act states that a division of revenue bill must be adopted
annually to specify the “equitable share” transfer to be made. The Financial
and Fiscal Commission makes recommendations to Parliament on each
such bill.
The Division of Revenue Act, 2004 provides a typical example of the
straightforward nature of these annual statutory allocations. Schedule 1
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identifies the monetary amount of revenue that is divided among the three
levels of government for the year. Schedule 2 divides the provincial share
among the nine provinces; Schedule 3 does the same for municipal gov-
ernments. Schedule 4 provides for general nationally assigned functional
transfers to the provinces. Schedule 5 identifies specific conditional grants,
and Schedule 6 identifies recurrent conditional grants.
The Financial and Fiscal Commission is a permanent expert commis-
sion that plays a major advisory role in South Africa’s intergovernmental
fiscal transfer system, with primarily “consultative and investigative powers
but not lawmaking or enforcement powers” (Motala and Ramaphosa
2002, p. 97). Sections 220–222 of the Constitution created the Financial and
Fiscal Commission, tasked with making independent and impartial
recommendations pertaining to fiscal matters. The Financial and Fiscal
Commission Act, 1997 provides a more thorough elaboration of the
functions and procedures of the commission. A constitutional amend-
ment and the Financial and Fiscal Commission Amendment Act, 2003
reduced the membership of the commission from 22 to 9 members, effec-
tive January 2004.
Before 1998 South Africa’s national government made direct expenditures
on health, social services, and roads—all areas of provincial responsibility.
Since 1998 a new system of largely unconditional transfer has become the rule,
diminishing federal spending power (Bahl 2001).
Given the relatively recent adoption of South Africa’s Constitution and
passage of the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, it remains to be seen
whether the legal basis for intergovernmental transfers will serve South
Africa well in the long run. But the relatively straightforward architecture of
constitutional provisions that mandate an annual statute, based on input
from an expert commission, holds much promise.
Procedures for Establishing and Modifying Intergovernmental
Transfers
Two main approaches to establishing and modifying intergovernmental fiscal
transfers prevail in the countries examined here. The first, and more straight-
forward approach, is negotiation between the federal government and sub-
units in which final agreement is subject to subunit consent (most often in the
upper house of the federal government). This approach is used in developed
countries, such as Belgium and Germany. The second, and more complex
approach, is consultation of the subunits combined with the involvement of a
specialized, independent commission that makes recommendations on the
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operation of the intergovernmental transfer system. This approach is used
in developing countries, such as India and South Africa.
Belgium
Belgium’s intergovernmental transfer system relies on special legislation that
includes the requirement that the French and Flemish communities consent.
Since this effectively gives these communities veto power, negotiation and con-
sensus building is a necessary part of any initiative to create or modify the inter-
governmental transfer system. The existing order can be overturned rapidly to
reflect political or economic exigencies.The Saint-Polycarpe (or Lambermont)
Agreement of January 2001, for example, enhanced the fiscal autonomy of the
regions and assisted communities by increasing federal transfers after the
French community’s education program faced financial difficulties.
Another player in Belgium’s fiscal landscape is the Conseil Supérier des
Finances, which is made up of 12 members, with an equal number of
French- and Flemish-speaking members and equal representation from fed-
eral and subunit governments. The Conseil Supérier des Finances makes
annual recommendations on the financial requirements of the federal and
subunit governments. Its recommendations have strong moral force and to
date have been largely followed.
Germany
An intergovernmental committee and the Bundesrat establish and modify
Germany’s intergovernmental transfer system, within the confines of the
relevant constitutional provisions. Simply put, “all federal financial legisla-
tion that allocates revenue that accrues to the states requires Bundesrat con-
sent”(Larsen 1999, p. 433). Therefore, the intergovernmental transfer system
can be modified only with the consent of the Länder. These negotiations
include incentives for the Länder to “team up”against the Bund, casting aside
political party affiliations in the interest of obtaining the best share for the
Länder possible. The Bund may use asymmetric supplementary grants to try
to break this coalition (Beierl 2001).
The Länder have legal standing to challenge intergovernmental fiscal
transfer legislation before the federal Constitutional Court, which has played
an activist role in setting the legislative agenda. The Court has held that the
Basic Law creates entitlements for financially distressed Länder to claim
financial assistance from the Bund. In one case, the Court agreed that
Bremen and Saarland were entitled to financial assistance but did not pre-
scribe a specific remedy, instead suggesting options, including additional
transfer payments to the poor Länder or even a redrawing of the territory to
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create economically sustainable subunits. The Bund opted to make DM3.4
billion in additional transfers to the two Länder through an amendment to
the equalization law.
India
The central government maintains wide discretion in creating and modifying
India’s system of intergovernmental transfers. While the recommendation of
the Finance Commission must be sought on such changes, the Commission
does not include members nominated by the states and its recommendations
are not binding.With respect to Planning Commission transfers, the states play
an influential consultative role, through the National Development Council, an
intergovernmental body chaired by the prime minister that includes members
of the Planning Council, center cabinet ministers, and state chief ministers.
South Africa
South Africa’s Constitution allows the “equitable share” intergovernmental
transfer to be “calculated based on cabinet judgments” (Bahl 2001, p. 28).
But it requires that provincial and organized local governments be con-
sulted. In practice, this involves a “complex bargaining process between dis-
tinct layers of government to determine the total amount of centrally
provided unconditional transfers” (Brosio 2000, p. 25). Fiscal transfers to
local governments in South Africa are generally based on annual decisions
of the central government, although some involve multiyear commitments.
Unlike in India, provincial nominees are appointed to the Financial and
Fiscal Commission in South Africa. However, despite the ability of the
provinces and local governments to nominate certain members, the Consti-
tutional Court has cautioned that “the Commission is hardly a vehicle for
the exercise of power by individual provinces” (Certification Case, Consti-
tutional Court of South Africa).
The provinces have a formal consultative role in intergovernmental
fiscal transfers in South Africa through the Budget Council, an intergovern-
mental political body with a general consultative mandate concerning fiscal
and financial matters. A representative of the Financial and Fiscal Commis-
sion attends the Budget Council’s meetings, which take place at least twice a
year. The Local Government Budget Forum is a similar body for municipal
government issues. It is through these bodies that consultation of the
provinces and local government is achieved each year before passage of the
division of revenue bill.
The nature of provincial consultation has been clarified by the Consti-
tutional Court based on the fact that the “equitable share”of a South African
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province is a “direct charge” from the National Revenue Fund. The Court has
considered the importance of this terminology and concluded that it does
not contemplate a money bill but “necessitates additional and direct con-
sultation with provincial interests rather than a mere indirect engagement
through the second House.”13 The Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa Second Amendment Act, 2001 made it explicit that a money bill does
not include equitable share transfers under Section 214 of the Constitution,
affirming the consultative role of the provinces in modifying the system of
intergovernmental transfers.
Conditional and Unconditional Transfers
Most intergovernmental transfer systems include a mix of conditional and
unconditional transfers. The legal basis for these transfers and the conse-
quences of violating the conditions may be clear and explicit or ambiguous.
In most countries, conditional grants are controversial but continue to be
relied on.
Conditional transfers are rare in Belgium’s system of intergovernmental
transfers and have been criticized as having a weak constitutional basis. In
Germany unconditional grants are generally the rule, with the notable
exception of some supplementary grants and shared-cost programs. The
trend in India has been toward increased use of conditional transfers to the
states in a vast array of centrally designed programs, including shared-cost
programs. South Africa relies on unconditional and conditional fiscal trans-
fers, both of which have an explicit constitutional basis.
Belgium
Conditional transfers are an exception to the norm in Belgium that federated
entities maintain fiscal discretion to manage their own resources. Conditional
transfers have been made, however, for measures for developing the interna-
tional role of Brussels and for regional programs to help the unemployed find
work. A nominal conditional transfer to communities also exists for employ-
ment programs and programs for foreign students. Conditional transfers
have been characterized as being “on the borderline of the Constitution” in
Belgium (Commission sur le Déséquilibre Fiscal 2002, p. 41).
Germany
Federal authorities in Germany must essentially convince a majority of the
Länder in the Bundesrat in order to make conditional transfers, and such
transfers have been criticized by the federal Constitutional Court. This has
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meant that intergovernmental transfers are generally unconditional,
notwithstanding important exceptions that involve supplementary grants
and shared-cost programs (see Bird and Tarasov 2002). In a 1975 case, the
federal Constitutional Court held that providing grants for urban renewal
“creates the risk that the Länder may become dependent upon the Federation
and thus endangers their constitutionally guaranteed autonomy . . . [There-
fore federal grants] remain the exception, and they must be so structured as
not to become the means of influencing decisions of the constituent states in
fulfilling their own responsibilities” (cited in Currie 1994, p. 58). On the facts
of the case, the transfer was allowed, since it preserved the autonomy of the
Länder by allowing them to determine where and how to spend the funds and
was expected to significantly enhance economic growth.
The conditionality of supplementary grants is more complex. Generally
speaking, “because they are meant to cover general financial need, the
supplementary grants may not be in the form of grants tied to particular
projects or tasks” (Larsen 1999, n. 51). An exception appears to relate to the
previous system of supplementary grants to the new Länder. Solidarity Pact
I consisted of an unconditional fiscal transfer (two-thirds) and a conditional
fiscal transfer (one-third) for specific investments under the Investment Pro-
motion Law Recovery East. Under Solidarity Pact II the grant is no longer
conditional in any way, but annual reports to the intergovernmental Finan-
cial Planning Council are required on the use of funds.
India
Both the Finance Commission and the Planning Commission make general-
purpose transfers to the states to use at their discretion. However, since the
First Finance Commission, conditional grants have been considered per-
missible under Article 275 of the Constitution, and these grants have
recently grown in importance in Indian fiscal federalism.14 In some cases,
“poorer states are unable to provide counterpart funds and are unable to
receive even the allocations made to them” (Rao n.d., p. 19).
Historically, conditional grants-in-aid that were recommended by the
Finance Commission were not scrutinized to determine whether their condi-
tions were satisfied. Since the Seventh Finance Commission, however, the
terms of reference have often sought recommendations on “the manner in
which such expenditure could be monitored”(Vithal and Sastry 2001, p. 156).
Planning Commission grants may be awarded based on certain condi-
tions, but the Constitution “does not provide principles governing such
grants” (Patil 1995, p. 59). The Planning Commission also monitors specific
earmarked grants for central sponsored schemes. These central ministry
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programs may include conditions related to staffing, infrastructure, and
implementation, with quarterly disbursements to promote compliance.
South Africa
The Constitution of South Africa expressly authorizes the provincial and
local government to “receive other allocations from national government
revenue, either conditionally or unconditionally.” Until 1998 fiscal trans-
fers to local governments in South Africa were a combination of general
and conditional transfers. It was widely held that this meant that “each
province was thus then at the mercy of the central government” (Brosio
2000, p. 27). A major policy shift took place in 1998 to a formula-based
system of largely unconditional intergovernmental transfers, known as
the equitable shares program (Bahl 2001).15 The total transfer is itself
unconditional.
There has been a “differential capacity and willingness of provinces to
supplement conditional grant funding with their unconditional equitable
share funds” (Submissions to Parliament 2004/05). This and other reasons
have led the Financial and Fiscal Commission to recommend “a negotiated
relationship between transferring and recipient authorities in respect of
conditional grants and a restraint on the use of conditional grants” (Sub-
missions to Parliament 2004/05).
The legal framework for conditional grants in South Africa is further
defined in the Division of Revenue Act. The act “assigns the role of com-
pliance monitoring to transferring national departments, but the moni-
toring capacity of some of the departments is weak” (Financial and Fiscal
Commission 2004). Where a province or municipal government does not
comply with the conditions of a fiscal transfer, the transferring entity
(national or provincial spheres) may delay, in full or in part, the payment
of the allocations, after consulting with the national treasury and relevant
provincial treasuries. If there is a “serious and persistent material breach”
of the conditions, the transfer may be withheld by a decision of the
national treasury (Financial and Fiscal Commission 2004).
Dispute Resolution and Adjudication
Disputes over intergovernmental fiscal transfers are resolved through a
combination of mechanisms and proceedings, including constitutional
principles, ad hoc political negotiations, mediation/conciliation at inter-
governmental forums, administrative proceedings, and litigation, including
constitutional adjudication. While most countries examined in this chapter
280 Sujit Choudhry and Benjamin Perrin
initially rely on political negotiations between the governments in disputes,
a range of possibilities exist.
In Belgium the federal loyalty principle places emphasis on political
negotiations or mediation/conciliation. A recent trend has been for certain
disputes over intergovernmental fiscal transfers to escalate to administrative
proceedings before the Cour d’Arbitrage and ultimately the Conseil d’État.
While the existence of a federal loyalty principle in Germany’s constitu-
tion has encouraged mediation, constitutional litigation has played a signif-
icant role in disputes over the intergovernmental transfer system. The federal
Constitutional Court has developed important jurisprudence in this field
that has been the basis for successful challenges to the equalization law.
The dispute resolution process governing India’s intergovernmental fiscal
transfers is not discussed in any detail in the literature reviewed. This is likely
due to the high degree of federal discretion involved in the system of grants and
the lack of a substantial provincial role in their creation or modification.
In South Africa the constitutional principle of cooperation places a
strong emphasis on extrajudicial dispute resolution to resolve conflicts over
intergovernmental fiscal transfers, including resort to mediation. Disputes
over conditional grants are determined initially by a unilateral decision of
the transferring entity and more permanently by a decision of the national
treasury. While the Constitutional Court has not been very active in adjudi-
cating specific disputes over intergovernmental transfers, it has made impor-
tant pronouncements that provide a basis for such claims.
Constitutional Principles
The constitutions of several of the countries examined enshrine principles
related to the emergence of conflict between levels of government. These
principles serve as a starting point in these countries when disputes con-
cerning intergovernmental transfers arise.
Belgium and Germany recognize the federal loyalty principle, or doc-
trine of federal comity (Bundesrüe). This doctrine essentially mandates the
mutual respect and cooperation of subunits and the federal government such
that they “act in such a way as to avoid all conflict of interest among them-
selves, the objective being to ensure that the various institutions function as
a balanced whole”(OECD 1997, p. 27). In Germany the federal Constitutional
Court has held that the Bundesrüe is an important constitutional principle
with respect to fiscal equalization.
Section 41 of the Constitution of South Africa enshrines a similar prin-
ciple of cooperation in intergovernmental relations, mandating an act of
Parliament to “establish or provide for structures and institutions to
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promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations . . . and provide for appro-
priate mechanisms and procedures to facilitate settlement of intergovern-
mental disputes.” The South African Division of Revenue Act, 2004 has as
one of its purposes “to ensure that legal proceedings between organs of state
[sic] in the three spheres of government are avoided as far as is possible.”
Ad Hoc Political Negotiations
In most countries ad hoc political negotiations are the first avenue for
resolving a dispute over intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Belgium’s
system has been described as based on compulsory negotiation, which
includes the dispute resolution role of the Senate and fiscal coordination
through the Conseil Supérier des Finances (Braun 2003). Despite the exis-
tence of these formal mechanisms of conflict resolution, “most coordina-
tion or conflict resolution takes place within or between political parties”
(Braun 2003, p. 43).
In South Africa, Section 31(1) of the Division of Revenue Act, 2004
provides that litigation is the absolute last resort in resolving any intergov-
ernmental fiscal dispute between state organs, after negotiated settlement
and the procedures in the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act have been
exhausted. In theory, these procedures could include referral of the dispute
to the Budget Council, a statutory intergovernmental body with consulta-
tive powers. Individuals responsible for prematurely resorting to litigation
risk liability for costs.
In Germany the Conference of the Finance Ministers of the Länder,
composed of the Land ministers of finance, negotiates common positions of
the Länder governments on fiscal matters with the Bund. Party affiliations,
however, play an important role in this process.
Mediation/Conciliation
Mediation/conciliation is an important step that is taken when ad hoc
political negotiations fail to reach a compromise. Belgium’s Coordination
Committee is an intergovernmental political body to which the federated
entities or federal government may refer a dispute to be resolved on the
basis of consensus. In Germany conflicts surrounding intergovernmental
fiscal transfers often involve the Mediation Committee of the Bundesrat,
considered part of a “compulsory negotiation system.” In South Africa the
Mediation Committee deals with bills related to the functions of the Finan-
cial and Fiscal Commission as well as bills affecting the finances of provin-
cial governments. Where mediation fails to resolve a dispute, the National
Assembly may still pass the bill if it can muster a two-thirds majority.
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Administrative Proceedings
In Belgium the Cour d’Arbitrage “is empowered to settle jurisdictional
disputes between the federal government, the Communities and the Regions
stemming from legislative measures”(Commission sur le Déséquilibre Fiscal
2001, p. 33). However, it is not considered to be part of the judiciary. The
chair of the Court alternates each year between a native French speaker and a
native Flemish speaker. The Cour d’Arbitrage has been asked to intervene to
enforce the legislative provisions of the intergovernmental transfer system
in Belgium.
The Conseil d’État has administrative jurisdiction to review legislation
to ensure that authorities do not exceed their powers. It held that it was by
no means clear that the Cour d’Arbitrage would be able to apply a purported
jurisdictional limit on regional taxation autonomy included in the Sainte-
Thérése agreement.
In South Africa the Division of Revenue Act calls for an administrative
process when a conflict arises over the conditions of a conditional fiscal
transfer. The first stage is a unilateral decision of the transferring entity
(national or provincial government), after consulting with the national
treasury and relevant provincial treasuries. The second stage involves a deci-
sion of the national treasury.
Judicial Review and Adjudication
Constitutional adjudication of disputes over intergovernmental fiscal
transfers is most developed in Germany, where multiple cases on the mat-
ter have been decided since 1952. The federal Constitutional Court has
jurisdiction to interpret the Basic Law and to adjudicate disputes between
the Bund and the Länder and among the Länder. Half of the judges of the
Court are elected by the Bundesrat and half are elected by the Bundestag.
Wealthier Länder have launched several constitutional challenges to the
equalization law, based in large part on the constitutional prohibition
against leveling, which was developed by the Court. Based on this doc-
trine, “financial equalization may not reduce the wealthier states’ per
capita tax income level all the way down to that of the poorer states”
(Larsen 1999, p. 446).
The Constitutional Court of South Africa has not been as involved in
adjudicating disputes as the federal Constitutional Court in Germany. How-
ever, in the Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996, it made important pronouncements in describing the constitutional
principles related to the system of intergovernmental transfers that may pro-
vide a basis for future constitutional litigation.
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Conclusions
Of the range of factors involved in making an intergovernmental transfer
system work, its legal architecture is but one. Political, economic, social,
geographic, and other influences contribute substantially to the success or
failure of aspects of each of the regimes described in this chapter.
This chapter focused on the practical benefits and shortcomings of these
systems that are connected to their legal frameworks. From this assessment,
some preliminary lessons can be drawn.
Belgium
Federal transfers are a vital aspect of fiscal federalism in Belgium. An eight-
country study by Bird and Tarasov (2002) finds that Belgium has had a
consistently high vertical fiscal imbalance, demonstrating the importance
of intergovernmental transfers in financing regional expenditures.
The ability of special legislation to accommodate innovative economic
design concepts for intergovernmental transfers demonstrates its main
strength: its flexibility. Despite the difficulties faced during periods of
political renegotiation, the use of special legislation rather than regular
legislation or fully entrenched constitutional rules appears to have provided
the best compromise in Belgium’s unique form of federalism. During the
negotiations over the so-called “permanent phase” of the intergovernmental
transfer system in Belgium, “tension between the federal government and
the communities overall was palpable. No entity wanted to renegotiate the
matter each year. However, the establishment of a fixed criterion risked
proving unfavorable to one level of government or the other”(Van der Stichele
and Verdonck 2002, p. 14). Special legislation has demonstrated itself
flexible enough to accommodate midterm entrenchment of a political com-
promise in a way that annual arrangements and long-term constitutional
provisions do not.
In contrast, the political renegotiation process in Belgium has been crit-
icized as favoring the subunits at the expense of the federal government and
taxpayers generally. The creation of political agreements, followed by special
legislation, has been the subject of judicial scrutiny in Belgium, to the extent
that these agreements present difficulties in adjudication.
Germany
Germany has had a consistently low vertical fiscal imbalance, indicating
that intergovernmental transfers are less important in financing regional
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expenditures there than in some other countries (Bird and Tarasov 2002).
Even Länder that criticize the intergovernmental transfer system in
Germany, such as Bavaria, recognize the benefits of having constitutional
authorization and principles for these transfers. With respect to vertical
transfers, this prevents transfers from becoming “subject to the free inter-
play of political forces” (Beierl 2001, p. 3). The federal Constitutional Court
has interpreted the constitutional provisions in a way that has “shaped the
political process within certain parameters” (Heun 1995, p. 182).
While it has faced challenges and tensions, the legal architecture of
Germany’s system of intergovernmental transfers has proven to be a remark-
ably versatile and stable vehicle through which the social consensus of the
country has manifested itself. Its constitutional framework, with principles
governing fiscal transfers; implementing laws, which require subunit
consent; and a neutral process for adjudicating disputes represent a powerful
combination.
Shah (2004, p. 11) applauds Germany’s fiscal capacity equalization
scheme to address regional fiscal disparities as an example of better practice.
In contrast, Spahn (2001, p. 11) argues that the intergovernmental transfer
system in Germany “has clearly been pushed beyond limits,”particularly with
respect to postunification interregional equalization. He illustrates the enor-
mity of these equalization transfers by noting that they amount to “more than
twice the official development aid of all industrialized countries to all devel-
oping countries in the world” (Spahn 2001, p. 13). Germany’s equalization
transfers have been criticized for “discouraging entrepreneurial spirit, and by
inducing moral hazard” (Spahn 2001, p. 13); limiting the flexibility and
responsiveness of the Länder; and reducing accountability of politicians.
Not surprisingly, the power of the Bundestag (made up of representa-
tives appointed by the Länder) to approve the federal statute that governs
vertical fiscal transfers (such as the VAT) has led to progressive increases in
the percentage allotted to the Länder at the expense of the Bund; a similar
phenomenon occurred in Belgium. The complexity and lack of transparency
in Germany’s intergovernmental fiscal transfer regime are also problems in
and of themselves.
India
Serious concerns have been raised about the effectiveness of the intergov-
ernmental transfer system in India, and studies have linked some of these
problems to the way in which its legal architecture has evolved. The involve-
ment of several agencies in the intergovernmental transfer system has been
criticized as inefficient and wasteful.
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In a leading study of Indian fiscal federalism, Rao and Singh (2000, p. 2)
find “some evidence to support the hypothesis that states with greater politi-
cal and economic influence or importance receive higher per capita transfers.”
This has been facilitated by a reduction in the percentage of fiscal transfers
determined based on objective factors in favor of increased discretion. Khe-
mani (2003) confirms that political bodies without constitutional authority,
such as the Planning Commission, have a tendency to award funds based on
political considerations (such as party affiliation of the state government
and the number of seats from a given state in the central government’s ruling
party or coalition). With respect to central ministry grants, Khemani (2003,
p. 5) finds that “national politicians indeed pursue disaggregated targeting
of individual districts to serve particular political objectives.”Constitutional
rules that determine intergovernmental transfers, it is concluded, do indeed
make a difference.
Indian fiscal federalism has also been criticized on the grounds that the
multiple central government agencies that are involved lack coordination.
Rao (n.d.) recommends that the Finance Commission focus on fiscal trans-
fers while the Planning Commission focuses on loans for infrastructure
projects. The criticism of the central ministry schemes, of which there are
now more than 250, is that they are highly susceptible to political manipu-
lation. Not surprisingly, an investigative report commissioned by the
National Development Committee recommended that these grants be
scaled down. Shah (2004, p. 6) has gone so far as to label these as “pork bar-
rel transfers or political bribes.” He also criticizes India’s transfers to address
regional fiscal disparities as a practice to avoid, given that it involves general
revenue sharing based on multiple factors. At the municipal level, the result
has been that “as state governments themselves are faced with several
resource constraints, the local bodies are unable to deliver the required stan-
dards of public services” (Rao n.d., p. 6).16
States also appear to have suffered from federal control over intergov-
ernmental fiscal transfers—the opposite of the pattern seen in Germany and
Belgium. The result is that the average state deficit in India increased from 3
percent of GDP in the 1980s to 4.4 percent in the 1990s. The relationship
between state fiscal transfers and indebtedness is particularly troubling. On
the one hand, fiscal transfers increase borrowing capacity. On the other
hand, borrowing increases dependence on the fiscal transfers. Rao (n.d.)
concludes that the state indebtedness that has resulted from this situation is
unsustainable for both those states that receive extra assistance from the
Planning Commission and those that do not. Khemani (2002) casts some
doubt on this conclusion.
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Purfield (2004, p. 4) concludes that the financial decline of Indian states
is the result of the institutions of fiscal federalism, which promote “transfer
dependence, common-revenue pools, moral hazard, and soft budget con-
straints.” State responsibilities are not met by their revenue-generating
capacity, so that transfers account for some 40 percent of state revenues.
Purfield also claims that the Tenth and Eleventh Finance Commissions
actually increased the financial disparity between states.
Conflict between the Finance Commission and the Planning Com-
mission has also arisen. Rao and Singh (2000) charge this has led to
numerous problems, including a decrease in equalization, poor coordi-
nation, and incentives for states to offer different projections to the two
commissions. The five-year tenure of the Finance Commission has also
been criticized as denying the body the institutional memory necessary to
fulfill its functions.
South Africa
South Africa has one of the highest fiscal imbalances in the world, at least
with respect to provinces. Provincial governments are highly dependent on
their unconditional equitable share transfers, with such funds constituting
87 percent of provincial budgets on average between 1999 and 2004. The
opposite is true in municipalities, transfers to which have been growing
faster than the national equitable share. Provincial deficits are projected to
reemerge as a result of higher social security costs in the coming years.
Shah (2004) has criticized South Africa’s transfers to address regional
fiscal disparities, because they involve general revenue sharing based on
multiple factors. Smoke (2001) also argues the need to improve the transfer
system, given the vertical fiscal imbalance and prevalence of conditional
transfers. Since the provinces do not have any independent sources of
revenue, they must rely entirely on central grants (Brosio 2000).
Common Findings
Some lessons can be drawn from this analysis. First, some important con-
clusions can be drawn about the general legal framework of intergovern-
mental fiscal transfers. The transfers should be objectively and transparently
determined, usually based on a recognized formula that is not the subject of
ongoing political negotiations. These arrangements should be established by
the central government, an expert commission, or an intergovernmental
committee (World Bank 2001).
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Second, the menu of procedures available for adopting and modifying
intergovernmental fiscal transfers involves tradeoffs. While some theorists
argue for nonnegotiable rules, in practice rules are almost always negotiable.
Every country resolves the tension between flexibility (for economic or polit-
ical reasons) and certainty (for planning public policy agendas) differently,
and the equilibrium between these two goals has shifted over time. The tra-
ditional view of intergovernmental finance, prevailing in the 1970s, suggested
that virtually everything to do with intergovernmental fiscal transfers should
be decided unilaterally by the federal government. This view still prevails in
developing countries such as India and South Africa. The emerging model is
one in which “jurisdictional boundaries and the assignment of functions and
finances have to be taken as determined at some earlier (constitutional) stage
and not open to further discussion in normal circumstances” (Bird and
Smart 2001, p. 12).
Third, conditional transfers remain a prevalent but troubling aspect of
intergovernmental fiscal finance. Indeed, “both theory and experience sug-
gest strongly that it is important to state expenditure responsibilities as clearly
as possible in order to enhance accountability and reduce unproductive over-
lap, duplication of authority, and legal challenges”(World Bank 2001, p. 267).
Fourth, the limits of law in optimizing an intergovernmental fiscal trans-
fer system are greatest when problems arise and dispute resolution or adjudi-
cation is required. This is so because a well-considered legal framework is a
necessary condition for any effective intergovernmental transfer system, but it
is not in itself a sufficient safeguard. As Smoke (2001, p. 3) notes, “no matter
what a constitution or enabling law says, central agencies rarely have a desire
to decentralize services, thereby losing prestige and resources.”
This chapter began by observing that it has been argued that “in the end
intergovernmental transfers are the instruments, not the determinants of
public policy”(Bird and Tarasov 2002, p. 23, emphasis in original). The find-
ings presented here demonstrate that legal frameworks are not simply empty
vessels to be filled. Each legal framework has its own internal biases, based
on who makes the intergovernmental transfer rules, who modifies them and
under what conditions, and who resolves conflicts when they arise. Each of
these “neutral” decisions carries intrinsic biases in favor of centralization
versus decentralization, political decision making versus more objective
assessment, fiscal autonomy versus fiscal prudence, and acceptance of
economic disparity versus insistence on fiscal solidarity. These preferences
are embedded in every intergovernmental transfer system and should
be deliberately considered at the moment their legal frameworks are
conceived and reformed.
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Notes
1. The seminal work is Oates (1972).
2. In Flanders the Flemish region and community have become essentially the same
unit, through a series of close cooperative agreements.
3. For a discussion of the earlier roots of German federalism and fiscal federalism, see
May (1969) and Bird (1986).
4. For a discussion of the constitutional debates surrounding this issue, see Haysom
(2001).
5. See Decree II of the French-speaking community of July 19, 1993, regarding the
transfer of certain fields of jurisdiction from the French-speaking community to the
Walloon region and the Commission Communautaire Française (Van der Stichele
and Verdonck 2002).
6. Citizens of the former German Democratic Republic represented about 20 percent
of Germany’s population in 1990 but contributed less than 6 percent of value added
(Spahn 2001).
7. Legislation provides that “the tax receipts of financially weak states are raised to up
to 92 percent of the average tax receipts of all states per inhabitant” (Beierl 2001, p. 6).
See also Spahn (2001).
8. For an overview of intergovernmental finance in India before independence, see
Vithal and Sastry (2001).
9. For a discussion of the early Finance Commissions, see Vithal and Sastry (2001), Rao
(1992), and May (1969).
10. Several Finance Commissions have considered whether there should be a perma-
nent Finance Commission, but the idea has been rejected on the grounds that a
freshly constituted set of members can be expected to be unbiased and treated dif-
ferently from full-time government employees (Vithal and Sastry 2001).
11. Parliament may increase any union custom or duty by a surcharge whose proceeds
go entirely to the union. It is too early to tell whether this will allow the union to
circumvent the general spirit of Article 270, which presumes that union taxes are
shared.
12. For a discussion of the controversy of the gap-filling approach, see Sury (1999).
13. All bills from the National Assembly are considered by the National Council of
Provinces, which is composed of 10 delegates from each province. If a bill does not
affect the provinces, the National Assembly may pass it regardless of the concerns of
the National Council of Provinces. If a bill does affect the provinces and the National
Council of Provinces rejects it, the matter is referred to a mediation committee,
made up of an equal number of National Assembly and National Council of
Provinces members. If the committee cannot resolve the issue, the National Assem-
bly may still pass the bill if it has at least a two-thirds majority.
14. Conditional transfers accounted for about 15 percent of state expenditures in the
1990s, up from just 7 percent in the 1980s (Rao and Singh 2000).
15. The provincial equitable sharing formula includes seven weighted components:
education (41 percent), health care (19 percent), social development/welfare
(18 percent), economic activity (7 percent), “basic” (7 percent), institutional
(5 percent), and capital “backlogs” (3 percent) (Financial and Fiscal Commission
2004).
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16. In the 1980s total state revenue grew 15.3 percent and total transfers 15.8 percent,
while expenditures grew 15.5 percent. In the 1990s fiscal imbalance emerged, as total
state revenue grew 12.8 percent and total transfers just 11.5 percent, while total
expenditures grew 14.3 percent (Rao n.d.).
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